Florida Journal of International Law
Volume 21

Issue 3

Article 3

December 2009

Legal Ramifications of the War in Gaza
Johan D. van der Vyver

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil

Recommended Citation
van der Vyver, Johan D. (2009) "Legal Ramifications of the War in Gaza," Florida Journal of International
Law: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

der Vyver: Legal Ramifications
of WAR
the WarIN
in Gaza
LEGAL van
RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE
GAZA

Johan D. van der Vyver*
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF GAZA

II.

WARS OF LIBERATION ................................................................. 411

III.

ACTS OF TERROR VIOLENCE ....................................................... 418

IV.

OPERATING FROM WITHIN A CIVILIAN ENVIRONMENT ...............

426

V.

SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES .........................................................

431

V I.

REPRISA L .................................................................................... 438

...................................... 407

V II. C ONCLUSION ............................................................................... 447

On December 27, 2008, Israel launched an armed attack against
Gaza, a Mediterranean territory with a population of 1.4 million
people.1 The offensive lasted 22 days before Israel on January 17, 2009
announced a unilateral cease fire, followed the next day by a unilateral
proclamation of a cease fire by the adversary forces.2 The Israeli cease
3
fire came within 12 hours after strenuous efforts by Egyptian mediators
to broker an agreement, and was deliberately timed to precede the
inauguration of President Elect Barack Obama (which occurred on
January 20, 2009). The withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the Gaza strip
4
commenced on Monday, January 19, 2009.
The Israeli offensive was primarily directed against members of
Hamas, a political organization which in 2007 staged a violent takeover
of political control in Gaza from forces of the rival Fatah faction.5
* I.T. Cohen Professor of International Law and Human Rights, Emory University
School of Law.
1. Taghreed EI-Khodary & Isabel Kershner, Israeli Attack Kills Scores Across Gaza,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/world/
middleeast/web28mideast.htnl.
2. Steven Erlanger, Israel Declares Cease-Fire; Hamas Says It Will Fight On, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.comf/2009/01/18/world/Iiddleeast/18
mideast.html.
3. Id.
4. Ethan Brohner, Israel Slows Withdrawal from Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/01/21/world/middleeast/21 mideast.html.
5. Hamas Takes Control of Gaza Strip, USA TODAY, June 16, 2007, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-06-14-gazaN.htm.
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Israel's stated goal was to put a permanent end to rocket attacks by
Hamas on towns and villages in the southern parts of Israel, 6 and to the
smuggling of weapons into Gaza. 7 Close to 1,300 Palestinians were
killed in the course of the attack, of whom more than half were
civilians. 8 According to preliminary estimates, approximately 4000
homes were destroyed and 20,000 seriously damaged. 9 This left about
10,000 inhabitants of Gaza homeless.' 0 Other properties that came
under the Israeli attacks included 219 factories and 400 schools."
During the fateful 22 days, Hamas fired hundreds of rockets into Israeli
territory. Israel suffered 13 casualties, of whom 10 were soldiers.12
Following the cease fire, Hamas Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh, in a
broadcast on the A1-Jazeera Arabic news channel, claimed a "heavenly
victory. ' 13 The truth of the matter is, though, that Hamas had failed to
turn Gaza into a graveyard for masses of Israeli soldiers as promised by
the Hamas leadership in the early stages of the Israeli offensive. 14 When
Israel announced imposing a cease fire, it stated in compelling terms
that any further rocket attacks by Hamas will be met with harsh
retaliatory measures. 15
However, it might turn out that in spite of having won the battle,
Israel may have lost the war. The Israeli aggression has been
condemned throughout the world, largely in consequence of the large
number of civilian casualties and extensive damage to property within
the war zone. 16 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was particularly
condemnatory of Israel when on January 15, the premises of the U.N.

6. Hamas Grants Fatah Rivals Amnesty, USA TODAY, June 16, 2007, available at

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-06-15-gaza-fridayN.htm.
7. Barak Ravid, Shin Bet: Nearly 70 Tons of Explosives Smuggled into Gaza Since IDF
OP, HAARETZ, Mar. 29, 2009, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1074682.
html.
8. Palestinians:1,300 Killed, 22,000 Buildings Destroyed in Gaza, CNN, Jan. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.cnn.com/ 2009/WORLD/meast/01/19/gaza.war/index.html [hereinafter
Palestinians: 1,300 Killed].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.

Id.

12.
13.

Id.
Ibrahim Barzak & Christopher Torchia, Israel, Hamas Cease Fire Agreed Upon,

18, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/18/
israel-hamas-cease-fire-a n158848.html.
14. Id.
15. Palestinians: 1,300 Killed, supra note 9.
16. United Nations Relief Work Agency, Refugee Stories: Attacks Against the UN in
Gaza, available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/stories/20O9/attacksun ingazajan09.

HUFFINGTON POST, Jan.
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Relief and Works Agency in Gaza came within the line of Israeli
artillery fire. 17
The purpose of this Article is to highlight the major rules of
international (humanitarian) law that have been implicated by the war in
Gaza. Needless to say, when applying those rules of law to the
empirical facts, and indeed in attempting to evaluate the claims and
disclaimers on both sides of the offensive, the issues at stake are
extremely complicated. Nor perhaps is the one-sided and almost
exclusive condemnation of the Israeli offensive entirely warranted; that
is, if the militant actions of Hamas is measured, objectively, against the
applicable rules of international humanitarian law.
The first section of this Article is devoted to the international status
of Gaza. It has been decided by an Israeli court that Gaza and the West
Bank constitute a single political unit.' 8 Palestinian territories have been
under Israeli occupation since 1967.19 Although Israel in 2005 officially
withdrew from the Gaza Strip, there are compelling grounds for
maintaining that Gaza is de facto still subject to Israeli occupation.2 ° If
that is found to be the case, resistance to Israeli occupation would
qualify as a war of liberation, which in terms of Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 is subject to the rules of
international humanitarian law applying to international armed
conflicts. 2' That is the focus of the second part of this Article. The
legality and legitimacy of a war of liberation do not afford a right to
freedom fighters to conduct hostilities by all conceivable means, and
especially do not exonerate the belligerents from attacking civilians or
civilian targets. The indiscriminate firing of rockets into Israeli towns
and villages constitute acts of terrorism. This truism is uncovered in the
third section of this Article. There are those who believe that freedom
fighters may with legal immunity commit acts of terror. This writer
does not share that view. Particularly contentious is the fact that Hamas
conducted its militant operations from within a civilian environment.22
The consequences of doing that is analyzed in the fourth section of this
17. Id.
18. Yossi Wolfson, Gaza: A Decade of Disengagement, CHALLENGE, Issue 90, Mar./Apr.
2005,
available at http://www.challenge-mag.com/en/article_ 136/gaza adecade of
disengagement.
19. Id.
20. Michael Chossudovsky, War and Natural Gas: The Israeli Invasion and Gaza's
Offshore Gas Fields, GLOBAL RES., Jan. 8, 2009.
21. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, art. 1(4), U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
22. Bill Varner, Israel Hamas Guilty of Gaza War Crimes, Probe Says, Bloomberg.com,
Sept.
15,
2009,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&
sid=aezwHhosYEzA.
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essay. The possibility of this amounting to using civilians as a human
shield is discussed at some lengths. It will appear that even if Hamas did
not deliberately seek shelter from Israeli attacks behind a civilian shield,
conducting military operations from within a civilian environment and
thereby placing the civilian population and civilian objects in harms
way constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs of armed
conflict.
In the fifth section, our focus shifts to Israel. It is there argued that
Israel had every right to defend itself against the armed attack
orchestrated by Hamas. However, the ways and means of doing that are
again not without far-reaching limitations. Since it was evident from the
outset that the offensive would be concentrated in a civilian
environment-admittedly through no fault on the part of Israel-Israeli
officials were nevertheless required, before launching an attack, to
consider the foreseeable civilian death and injuries and damage to
civilian objects. If those were contemplated to be excessive in relation
to the overall military advantage to be gained by the attack, Israel acted
in violation of the rules of international humanitarian law relevant to
collateral civilian deaths and injuries and damage to civilian objects.
Section six again turns our attention to Hamas. The law relating to
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense does not apply
to Hamas, since the hardships suffered by Gaza residents in
consequence of Israeli control measures did not amount to an armed
attack as required by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 23 At their best, the
rocket attacks could be seen as countermeasures (if Israel is found not to
be an Occupying Power in Gaza) or as belligerent reprisals (if Israel has
continued to be in occupation of Gaza). It is there argued that
countermeasures may not include military action, and that belligerent
reprisals may not be aimed at the civilian population or civilian targets.
The concluding section argues that the crisis in the Middle East
cannot be resolved through armed interventions and expresses the hope,
inspired by Article 33 of the U.N. Charter, that the Parties to the dispute
may find the will and the means to "seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
References in this Article to provisions in the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) perhaps need clarification.
25
Neither Israel nor Palestine are States Parties to the ICC Statute.
23.

U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, art. 51.

24.
25.

Id art. 33.
The American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the International

Criminal Court, Communications to the ICC Concerning the Situation in Gaza, available at
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Gaza.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
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Prosecutions of crimes committed during the war in Gaza can therefore
only be investigated and prosecuted in the ICC if the situation is
referred to the Prosecuting Office of the ICC by the Security Council of
the United Nations (and such a referral is subject to the veto powers of
the Permanent Members of the Security Council). Failing a Security
Council referral, the situation can also be investigated by the Prosecutor
if Israel (being the national State of persons who may be indicted),
acting pursuant to Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute, expressly accepts
the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC (which is highly unlikely). Since
Palestine (being that territory where the alleged crimes were committed)
is not a State, it cannot trigger the exercise of ICC jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 12(3).26 The importance of the ICC Statute derives from the
fact that the crimes subjected to ICC jurisdiction were singled out by the
Rome Conference upon the understanding that they were all crimes
under customary international law. One may therefore safely assume
that the ICC Statute reflects the laws and customs of international
humanitarian law that have become part of customary international law.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF GAZA
Although territorially isolated from the West Bank, Gaza is part and
parcel of Palestine. Israeli courts have recognized that much. In Ajuri v.
IDF Commander, the Israel Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, 27 was called upon to exercise judicial review of the legality of a
decision of an Israeli military commander to order the resettlement of
three suspected collaborators with a Palestinian terrorist to leave their
home in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and move to a residence in
28 The High Court declined to
the Gaza Strip for a period of two years. 28
26. In early February 2009, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moren-Ocampo made it known that
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) President Mahmoud Abbas had petitioned the ICC to
exercise jurisdiction over possible war crimes committed in the Gaza Strip, noting that the Court
will first have to decide whether the PNA qualifies for statehood for purposes of triggering the
exercise ofjurisdiction by the ICC under Article 12(3).
27. Where the Israeli Supreme Court sits as a High Court of Justice, its function is
confined to reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion by an executive official. In
accordance with general principles of administrative law, the Court cannot substitute its own
discretion for that of the Military Commander. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of
Israel [2005] IsrSC 31, available at http://www.zionism-israel.com/hdoc/HighCourtFence.
htm; see 37 ISR. Y.B. INT'L L. 345 (2007). The Court must ensure that the norms of substantive
and procedural fairness, the obligation of administrative officials to act reasonably, and the
principle of proportionality, have been upheld. Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. &
Commander of the IDF Forces in the W. Bank [2004] IsrSC 58(5). For further discussion on the
Ajuri Case, see Adam Shinar, Constitutions in Crisis: A Comparative Approach to Judicial

Reasoning and Separationof Powers, 20 FLA. J. INT'L L. 115 (2008).
28. HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IscSC 52(3)
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deal with this issue as a matter of deportation, holding that Judea and
Samaria on the one hand and the Gaza Strip on the other constitute "a
single territorial unit" as "part of mandatory Palestine. 29
Palestine was subjected to Israeli control-or to be more correct, of
that of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)-following the Six-Day War of
1967. For purposes of the present survey, I shall not dwell upon earlier
assumptions of Israel as to its title to Palestinian territories. 3U Suffice it
to say that Israel has come to accept:
That the Judea and Samaria areas (and earlier also the Gaza
Strip) are 31or were) held by the State of Israel in belligerent
occupation;
That the occupied territories are under control of the Military
described in one of the
Commander of the IDF in those territories,
32
State";
the
of
arm
long
"the
as
judgments
That occupation is essentially a temporary state of affairs, 33 and
precautionary measures must therefore also be
military or security
34
limited in time;

That action taken by the Military Commander to promote the
military demands of the Occupying Power and for security reasons
cannot be motivated by a desire to annex land within the occupied
territory. 35

29. Id.
22. The Court's assumption that Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
does not apply lost sight of the fact that this Article applies to both deportations and forcible
transfers and that forcible transfers can occur within the borders of an occupied territory. Id.
17.
30. See, e.g., Michael Galchinsky, The Jewish Settlements in the West Bank:
InternationalLaw and IsraeliJurisprudence,9 ISRAELI STUD. 115 (2004).
31. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council 23; H.C. 7957/04 Mara"abe 14.
32. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council 23; Mara 'abe,H.C. 7957/04, 14.
33. HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe 22.
34. HCJ 370/79 Mustafa Dweikat & others v. Gov't of Isr., 9 (Elon Moreh Case),
summarized in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 345, 350 (1979).
35. HCJ 606/78 Ayoob v. Minister of Defense, IsrSC 32(2) 113, 122, summarized in 9
ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTs. 337 (1979); HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council, 27; HCJ 2056/04
Mara 'abe, 7 15, 16; see Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, U.S.T. 539,
reprinted in I BEvANs 631 & 2 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 90 (1908) [hereinafter Hague
Convention No. IV] (providing in respect of occupied territories: "Family honor and rights, the
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected. Private property can not be confiscated").
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The exact status of Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has
remained a matter of dispute, though. In June 1967, the Security
Council of the United Nations emphasized the principle of respect for
the territorial integrity and political independence of States, 36 and called
for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied
during the Six-Day War. 37 Yoram Dinstein noted way back in 1998 that
a distinction must be made between the nature of the occupation by
Israel of the Golan Heights on the one hand, and of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip on the other. 38 Israel was indeed still in belligerent
occupation of the Golan Heights, since the war between Israel and Syria
which commenced in 1967 has not been terminated. 39 However, given
various peace agreements that have been concluded between Israel and
Egypt (in regard to the Gaza Strip) and between Israel and Jordan (in
regard to the West Bank), belligerent occupation by Israel has come to
an end and Israel can at best be said to maintain
a special regime of
40
post-belligerent occupation in those territories.
Since the Dinstein article was published in 1998, there have been
further developments in the Gaza Strip which have affected the status
under the rules of international humanitarian law of that territory. In
December 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced Israel's
intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria and to
relocate Israeli settlers from those regions. Disengagement from the
territories concerned was sanctioned by the Disengagement Plan
Implementation Law-2005, the legality of which was subsequently
endorsed by the Israel Supreme Court. 4 1 Following the disengagement
on September 12, 2005, and in spite of ongoing violence and acts of
retaliation by Israel in the region, Israel, according to some analysts,
was no longer in occupation of the Gaza Strip.42
The fact is, though, that Gaza's airspace, coastal waters, and border
crossings have remained under Israeli control. Water and electricity
supply to Gaza, and entry into and exit from the territory, are entirely
dependent on Israeli benevolence. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
Violations in Palestine of the Commission on Human Rights (now the
Human Rights Council), John Dugard, has therefore noted that Israel
36. S.C. Res. 242, 1(i) U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 22, 1967).
37. Id. l(i).
38. Yoram Dinstein, The International Legal Status of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip-1998, 28 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 37 (1998).
39. ld.at4l.
40. Id. at 42-49.
41. HCJ 1661/05 Gaza Coast Reg'l Council v. Knesset of Isr., IsrSC 49(2) 481,
summarized in 37 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 358 (2007).
42. See, e.g., Nicholas Rostow, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon: Three Occupations Under
International
ISR. Y.B. HuM.
RTS. 205, 2009
216-21 (2007).
Published
by UFLaw,
Law37Scholarship
Repository,
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has not altogether given up de facto control 43
of Gaza and consequently
remained an Occupying Power in that region.
It has been decided that "territory is considered to be occupied when
it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army, and the
occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been
established and can be exercised." 44 This circumscription was based on
Hague Convention No. IV,45 and has come to be accepted as customary
international law. 46 In the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v. Uganda),
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) spoke of the occupying Power
substituting its own authority for that of the government of the occupied
territory.47 Having decided that Uganda "was an occupying Power in
[the Congolese province of] Ituri at the relevant time,' 4 the Court went
on to find as a matter of fact "that the Republic of Uganda, by engaging
in military activities against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on
the latter's territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively extending
military, logistical, economic, and financial support to irregular forces
having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of
non-use of force in international relations and the principle of nonintervention. ' 49 Israel did not do all of these things in Gaza, but the
principle laid down in Hague Convention No. IV must be applied to the
circumstances that present themselves on a case by case basis. We shall
assume that the border control exercised by Israel does in fact amount to
occupation of the Gaza Strip.

43. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [E], Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the
Occupied Arab Territories,Including PalestineT 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/29 (Jan. 17, 2006)
(prepared by John Dugard).
44. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 2, 78 (July 9); see also Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 1, 172, at 59 (Dec. 19); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. TCC-01/0401/06-803-tEN, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 212 (Jan. 29, 2006).
45. Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 35, art. 42.
46. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 2004 I.C.J., 78. Israeli courts also accept provisions contained in the Regulations
annexed to Hague Convention No. IV as rules of customary international law (how else, since
charges brought against German war criminals in Nuremberg were in part based on those
Regulations). HJC 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. [2005]
IsrSC.
47. See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J., T
173, at 59; see also Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, 213.
48. See Case ConcerningArmed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005 I.C.J.
178, 179, at 60.
49. Id. 345, at 101.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/3
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II. WARS OF LIBERATION
Israel and Hamas have been exchanging punches in the combat for
designating the ultimate cause of the violence and counter-violence that
culminated in the Israeli offensive. Who is to blame? Israel maintained
that it responded to the continuous rocket attacks aimed at Israeli
targets, while Hamas claimed that the rocket attacks were provoked by
the hardships caused in Gaza in consequence of the Israeli grip on
border crossings and control by Israel of water supplies, electricity, and
humanitarian aid packages into the Gaza Strip. One is tempted to say,
history will tell; but history can be manipulated by its interpreters to suit
their own prejudices and perceptions of self-righteousness. Let us
assume, therefore, without deciding, that Israel in the final analysis
provoked the militant responses of Hamas.
The Hamas response will then neatly fit into the international
concept of a war of liberation, defined in Protocol I as "armed conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to
self-determination.,' 50 In terms of Protocol I, wars of liberation are
governed by the rules of humanitarian law applying to international
armed conflicts. 51 It might be mentioned, as an aside, that Israel has not
ratified Protocol I and has persistently denied the binding force upon
itself of the provision proclaiming that resistance to Israeli occupation
of Palestinian territories and Israel's responses to such resistance are
governed by the rules applying to international armed conflicts.
Protocol I does not expressly address the question when exactly the
uprising against a foreign occupying power would qualify as an armed
conflict. There are indications, though, that the liberation forces taking
up arms must be an organized armed force under responsible
command.52 Article 96(3) of Protocol I thus provides that "[t]he
authority representing a people engaged against a High Contracting
Party in an armed conflict" can bring the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I to bear on the armed struggle by making a declaration to
apply those instruments, and further provides that "the said authority
assumes the same rights and obligations as those which have been
assumed by a High Contracting Party to the Conventions and this

50. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 1(4).
51. Id.; see Karl Joseph Partsch, Armed Conflict, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 249, at 251 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) (including wars of liberation in
the list of international armed conflicts).
52.

See MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:

COMMENTARY ON THE TWO PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

46 (1982).by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
Published

1949,

at
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Protocol. 53 Although we know that the Palestinian Liberation
Organization has made an Article 96(3) Declaration, it would seem that
Hamas has not.
Proclaiming wars of liberation to be governed by the rules applying
to international armed conflicts coincided with the sympathy disclosed
by a cross section of the international community for the noble cause of
54
freedom fighters. The 1968 World Conference on Human Rights
adopted a Resolution on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, which not
only set the proceedings in motion that culminated in the 1977 Protocols
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949," but also called for the
protection as prisoners of war or political prisoners of captives from
among the ranks of those who struggle against minority racist and
colonial regimes.56 This Resolution sparked a series of annual General
Assembly resolutions on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts,
which called for the full protection of civilians and combatants in
conflicts which arise from the struggle of peoples under colonial and
foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and for the better
application of existing humanitarian conventions and rules to such
conflicts. 57 The Resolution also supported the effort of the Conference
of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts from
which the 1977 Protocols emerged. 58 The General Assembly of the
United Nations has time and time again recognized the legitimacy of the
struggle of peoples under colonial rule, foreign domination or a racist
53. Protocol I,supra note 21, art. 96(3) (emphasis added).
54. The World Conference, held in Tehran, was designed to take stock of the state of
human rights in the world after twenty years of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
55. International Conference on Human Rights, April 22-May 13, 1968, Final Act, Res.
XXIII, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 12, 1968) (noting that the Geneva Conventions of 1949
were not sufficiently broad in scope to cover all armed conflicts and calling for the adoption of
new rules of international law relating to armed conflicts).
56. Id.
57. G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 19, 1968); see also G.A. Res.
2597 (XXIV), at 62, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 16, 1969); G.A. Res. 2674 (XXV), at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (Dec. 9, 1970) (calling for the treatment as prisoners of war of participants in
resistance movements and freedom fighters in Southern Africa and territories under colonial and
alien domination and foreign occupation, struggling for their liberation and self-determination);
G.A. Res. 2852 (XXVI), at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 20, 1971).
58. G.A. Res. 2853 (XXVI), at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 20, 1971); G.A. Res. 3032
(XXVII), at 117, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (Dec. 18, 1972); G.A. Res. 3102 (XXVIII), at 141, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 12, 1973); G.A. Res. 3319 (XXIX), at 145, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14,
1974); G.A. Res. 3500 (XXX), at 153, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 31/19, at
180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/39 (Nov. 24, 1976); G.A. Res. 32/44, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/45
(Dec. 8, 1977) (commending the Diplomatic Conference for the conclusion of its work on the
1977 Protocols).
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/3
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regime, 59 adding in a series of subsequent resolutions that the
"legitimate 60struggle" includes the armed struggle of liberation
movements.
Applying the rules applicable to international armed conflicts to
wars of liberation has been criticized as "a heresy of the United
61
Nations" and "insupportable in theory and inadequate in practice."
This criticism presupposes that an armed struggle for the attainment of
self-determination is essentially a matter between a government and the
governed and therefore one not of an international character. 62 That is
the main fallacy of the argument.
Armed conflicts against alien occupants of a country would indeed
be of an international character; that is, if one assumes that
"international" in this context bears a territorial or geographical
connotation.
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
includes in the concept of international armed conflict "all cases of
declared war of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties"; 63 and this in contradistinction
to an armed conflict not of an international character, which in terms of
Common Article 3 is one "occurring in the territory of one of the High

59. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3163 (XXVIII)
5, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 14, 1973)
(proclaiming the legitimacy of the struggle of the people under colonial and alien domination to
exercise their right to self-determination and independence "by all the necessary means"); G.A.
Res. 3411 (XXX) G5, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 10, 1975) (proclaiming the legitimacy of the
struggle against a racist regime "by all means possible"); G.A. Res. 35/206A,
1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/35/48 (Dec. 16, 1980); G.A. Res. 36/172A, 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/51 172 (1981);
and see also S.C. Res. 473,
4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/473 (Dec. 17, 1980) (proclaiming the
legitimacy of the struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid); see
Stephen M. Schwebel, Wars of Liberation--asFought in U.N. Organs, in LAW AND CIWL WAR
INTHE MODERN WORLD, 218 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
60. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/69A, 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/51 (Dec. 9, 1982); G.A. Res.
38/39A, 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/47 (Dec. 5, 1983).
61. G.I.A.D. Draper, HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights, in 1979 AcTA JURIDICA 193,
at 205.
62. Id. at 203-06.
63. Geneva Conventionfor the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded andSick in
Armed Forces in the Field, 1949, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 6 U.S.T. 3115; T.I.A.S. No. 3362
[hereinafter Geneva Convention No. I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at Sea, 1949, art. 2, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; 6 U.S.T. 3219; T.I.A.S. No. 3363 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 6
U.S.T. 3316; T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protectionof Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, art. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 6
U.S.T. 3516; T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV].
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Contracting Parties. 64 Taking its lead from Common Article 2, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that an international
armed conflict is essentially one between two or more High Contracting
Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; and since al
Queda was not a High Contracting Party, its members were not entitled
65
to the broader protections applicable in international armed conflicts.
In the Circuit Court, Williams, J. (concurring) assumed, with reference
to the wording of Common Article 2, that "the words 'not of an
international character' are sensibly understood to refer to a conflict
between a signatory nation and a non-state actor." 66 The U.S. Supreme
Court decided more decisively that al Queda captives were entitled to
the protections listed in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949,67 thereby proceeding on the assumption that the
"war on terror," though not confined to the territory of a single State, is
an armed conflict not of an international character. The Court noted
(without deciding) that different rules might apply to Taliban captives,
since they are associated with the State of Afghanistan. 68 Based on this
assessment, the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas will
at best
69
character.
international
an
of
not
conflict
armed
an
as
qualify
64. Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. II, supra
note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. IV,
supra note 63, art. 3.
65. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, at 630-31 (2006); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
415 F.3d 33, 41-42 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
66. Hamdan,415F.3dat44.
67. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-31.
68. Id. at 629. The American legislature ignored the distinction made between al Queda
and Taliban captives and designated both as essentially "unlawful enemy combatants." See
Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 948a(1)(I) (including in the concept of "unlawful enemy
combatant," "a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposely and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not lawful enemy
combatants (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces)").
69. The literalist interpretation of Geneva law in Hamdan, and the narrow perception of
"international armed conflict" stemming from that approach, was adhered to in the United States
for all the wrong reasons. International humanitarian law is designed to extend to an absolute
maximum the protections afforded to all persons and properties at risk in an armed conflict. The
United States, by contrast, preferred an ultra-conservative approach for the primary purpose of
depriving certain captives of (some of) the protections of Geneva law. If literalism were to be
the way to go, why then not take Common Article 3 as one's point of departure? Common
Article 3 defines an armed conflict not of an international character as one "occurring in the
territory on one of the High Contracting Parties," which would mean, ex contrario, that all
armed conflicts transcending the national borders of a single State (such as the "war against
terror") would qualify as an international armed conflict. See Geneva Convention No. I, supra
note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. II, supra note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. III,
supra note 63, art. 3; Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 3. For more information on
Hamden, see generally Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creatinga Hybrid Paradigmfor
the Detention of Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 511 (2007).
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The American perception of what constitutes an international armed
conflict is not supported by authoritative interpretations of international
humanitarian law. In Prosecutorv. Dugko Tadi6, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), also taking its lead from Common Article 2, decided that an
armed conflict is international:
If the parties to the conflict are two or more States;
If the hostilities erupted internally within the borders of a
single State but another State intervened in the conflict through
its troops (in which event the armed conflict becomes
international when troops of the other State become involved in
the hostilities); or
If some of the participants
in the internal armed conflict act
70
on behalf of the other State.
In the Confirmation of Charges Decision in the case of Prosecutorv.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) endorsed the decision of the ICTY, 71 but added a
fourth instance of international armed conflicts, namely:
The partial or total occupation by one State of the territory
of another State, irrespective of whether the occupation meets
with armed resistance.
Applying the above to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza is
complicated by the fact that Palestine is not a State, let alone a High
Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
However, the primary purpose of international humanitarian law is the
preservation of human dignity, 73 and "technicalities" deriving from a
literalist interpretation of Geneva law should not stand in the way of
affording the greatest possible protections to every person whose safety
or well-being is implicated by an armed struggle between whomsoever.

70. Prosecutor v. Du~ko Tadid, Case No. IT- 94-1-A, Judgment, 84 (15 July 1999).
71. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges),
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN,
209 (29 Jan. 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Submission of the Document Containing the Charges pursuant to Article
61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence pursuant to Rule 121(3)), Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-356,
12(i) (28 Aug. 2006).
72. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN,
209; see Elements of Crimes, n.34,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2 (July 6, 2000), ASPOR (First Session), ICC-ASP/1/3 Pt.
II.B, at 108 (Sept. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes] (stating: "The term 'international
armed conflict' includes military occupation').
73. Prosecutor v. Anto Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, 162 (Dec. 10, 1998).
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International humanitarian law is by its very nature destined to
afford the greatest possible protection to persons and property in times
of armed conflict, and its provisions should therefore be benevolently
interpreted to redeem that objective to an absolute maximum. Protocol I
was thus intended to broaden as far as possible the categories of persons
entitled to such protection. 74 Purposive interpretation must, in a word,
prevail over literalism, with the humanitarian focus of the law of armed
conflict as its ultimate and decisive goal. As noted by the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadi6, "[I]ntemational
humanitarian law . . . is not grounded on formalistic postulates ....

Rather, it is a realistic body of law, grounded on the notion of
effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring
deviation from its
75
standards to the maximum extent possible."
The preferred approach may be illustrated with reference to a
provision in the Fourth Geneva Convention which seemingly confined
the protection of that Convention to "Persons... in the hands of a Party
to the conflict.., of which they are not nationals." 76 In cases where
ethnic groups from within the same State are at war, denying the
protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention to members of the one
group who have fallen into the hands of their adversary has been
criticized for being "unacceptably literalist." 77 That exactly was the
point in Prosecutorv. Dugko Tadi6. In identifying those "in the hands of
a Party to the conflict of which they are not nationals," the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY preferred to apply "substantial relations" rather
than "formal bonds" of citizenship. 78 The Court noted that the principle
underlying application provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention
requires that all those who might share the nationality of the enemy but
who have become refugees and therefore no longer owe allegiance to,
or enjoys diplomatic protection of, the State concerned must be afforded
the status of protected persons.7 9 The Appeals Chamber concluded as
follows:
This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations more
than on formal bonds, becomes all the more important in
present-day international armed conflicts. While previously
wars were primarily between well-established States, in
74. See BOTHE ET AL., supra note 52, at 250.
75. Dugko Tadi6, IT- 94-1-A, 96.
76. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 4.
77. Theodor Meron, How Do Human Rights Humanize the Law of War?, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE DOWNTRODDEN: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ASBJoRN EIDE

157, at 165 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2003) [hereinafter ESSAYS INHONOUR OF ASBJORN EDE].
78. Duko Tadi6, IT- 94-1-A, 166.

79. Id. 165.
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modem inter-ethnic armed conflicts such as that in the former
Yugoslavia, new States are often created during the conflict
and ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds
for allegiance. Or, put another way, ethnicity may become
determinative of national allegiance. Under these conditions,
the requirement of nationality is even less adequate to define
protected persons. In such conflicts, not only the text and the
drafting history of the Convention but also, and more
importantly, the Convention's object and purpose suggest that
allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly,
control by this Party over persons in a given territory, may be
regarded as the crucial test.
In the CelebiLi Case, the Appeals Chamber likewise proceeded on
the assumption that the nationality requirement of the Fourth Geneva
Convention must be considered "in a more flexible manner," bearing in
mind that "the Conventions have been drawn up first and foremost to
protect individuals, and not to serve State interests" and consequently,
that its protections should be applied "to as broad a category of persons
as possible." 81 The victims of atrocities committed in the Celebidi
prison camp were singled out mainly because of their Serb identity and
were regarded by the Bosnian authorities as "belonging to the opposing
party in an armed conflict." 82 They did not fall within the confines of
persons protected under any of the other Geneva Conventions and must
therefore, in spite of being citizens of the same State as their 83
tormentors,
be afforded the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention:
This interpretation of the Convention is fully in accordance
with the development of the human rights doctrine which has
been increasing in force since the middle of ... [the twentieth]
century. It would be incongruous with the whole concept of
human rights, which protect individuals from the excesses of
their own government, to rigidly apply the nationality
requirement of article 4, that was apparently inserted to prevent
interference in a State's relations with its own nationals.
Furthermore, the nature of the international armed conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the complexity of modem
conflicts and not, perhaps, the paradigm envisaged in 1949. In
80. Id. 166; see also Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 151
(Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic (the "Celebidi Case"), Case No. IT-96-21-A, 84
(Feb. 20, 2001).
81. Zejnil Delali, IT-96-2 1-T, 263.
82. Id. 265.
83. Id. 263.
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order to retain the relevance and effectiveness of the norms of
the Geneva8 4Conventions, it is necessary to adopt the approach
here taken.
As far as the conflict in Palestine is concerned, the question as to the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions has perhaps become academic
since Israel has committed itself to abide by the humanitarian provisions
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.8 5 In Ajuri v. IDF Commander,
counsel for the Respondent reiterated that the Fourth Geneva
Convention does not reflect customary international law but noted that,
"in accordance with the long-established practice of the Government of
Israel," the humanitarian parts of the Convention should nevertheless be
applied.86 The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, decided accordingly that humanitarian international law as
reflected in the Fourth Geneva Convention, "and certainly" in the 1907
Hague Convention No. IV, is to be applied in the case of forcible
assignment of residence.87 As noted in one of its judgments: "Indeed,
every Israeli soldier carries in his pack the rules of customary public
international law regarding88the law of war, and the fundamental rules of
Israeli administrative law."
Il. ACTS OF TERROR VIOLENCE
Hamas is said to be a terrorist organization. It was for that reason not
invited to participate in negotiations for peace in Gaza initiated by
Egypt in January 2009 and which included delegations from France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the Czech Republic
(holder of the rotating European Union presidency).

84. Id. 266.
85. Theodor Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw in the
Periodof Transition, 9 ISRAEL Y.B. INT'L L. 106, 108 (1979) (noting that the Fourth Geneva
Convention is regarded by Israel as not being applicable since Jordan's standing in the West
Bank was that of"a belligerent occupant following an unlawful invasion").
86. HCJ 7051/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander [2002] IsrSC 52(3) 13.
87. Id.; see also HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. & Commander of
the IDF Forces in the W. Bank, H.C. 2056/04, 58(5) Piskei Din 807, 23 (30 June 2004))
(noting that the Parties agreed that the humanitarian rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention is to
be applied to the issues under review in that case).
88. HCJ 393/82 Jam'iat Ascan Elma'almoon Eltha'aooniah Elmahdula ElmaooliehMalmun el-Mahdudeh el-Masauliyeh v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria
Area IsrSC 37(4) at 810; HCJ 957/04 Mara'abe, 14.
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Terrorism comprises: 89 (i) acts of violence; 90 (ii) deliberately aimed
at civilian targets; 9' (iii) with a view (mostly) to promoting a
preconceived political objective; 92 (iv) by means of intimidating the
target of such violence (which need not be, and seldom is, the victims
themselves); 93 (v) to submit to the demands of the perpetrators; 94 (vi)
9
out of fear emanating from the threat or actual abhorrence of the act.
The typical terrorists are fanatically devoted to the objective which they
seek to promote, and act from an inflated sense of self-righteousness.
89. See J.D. van der Vyver, State Sponsored Terror Violence, 4 Sou. AFR. J. HUM. RTs.
55, 59-60 (1988); INGRID DETrER DE Lupis, THE LAW OF WAR, 19-23 (1987).
90.

CARLOS MARIGHELLA, MINIMANUAL OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA 103 (1971) (referring

to the following strategies of terror: "Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms,
the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnapping, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves");
Yonah Alexander, Terrorism and the Media: Some Considerations,in TERRORISM: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, 159 (Yonah Alexander et al. eds., 1979) (referring to the terrorist's "instruments of
psychological and physical force-including intimidation, coercion, repression, and, ultimately,
destruction of lives and property").
91. Mario 'n Mushat, The Soviet Concept of Guerilla Warfare, 7 Sou. Am. Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 4 (1981) (singling out civilian targets and "the suffering of innocent people" as the main
targets of a terrorist).
92. Many writers emphasize the political nature of a terrorist's objective. See Alexander,
in TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 90, at 159 (referring to terrorism as "an
expedient tactical and strategic tool of politics in the struggle for power within and among
nations..."); David Carlton, The Future of PoliticalSub-state Violence, in TERRORISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE, supra note 90, at 201 (including in the concept of a terrorist "any perpetrator of
substate violence whose motives are broadly of a political character"). However, terrorism need

not be politically motivated and might be resorted to by ordinary criminals and psychopaths. See
GRANT WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM: THEORY, TACTICS AND COUNTER-MEASURES, 8-9
(1982). It might furthermore be motivated by either social or political grievances. F.C. Pedersen,
Comment: ControllingInternationalTerrorism:An Analysis of UnilateralForce and Proposals
for MultilateralCo-operation, 8 TOLEDO L. REv. 209 (1976), quoted by T.M. Kfihn, Terrorism
and the Right of Self-Defence, in 6 Sou. Arm. Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 42 (1980).
93. Abraham H. Miller, Hostage Negotiations and the Concept of Transference, in
TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 90, at 155 (maintaining that "Terrorism by
definition is an act that seeks to influence a population significantly larger than the immediate
target"); see also WARDLAw, supra note 92, at 10.
94. JOHN BAYLIS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIES: THEORY AND POLITICS 132, 137
(1975) (maintaining that "Intimidation and terrorism are used not only to publicize the
movement, to demoralize the government, and to polarize society but also at times to ensure that
people have no alternative but compliance, unless and until the government is able to protect
them").
95. WARDLAw, supra note 92, at 10 (designating as the distinguishing feature of
terrorism, "the design to create anxiety"); see also Lawrence Freedman, Terrorism and Strategy,
in TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER, 56 (Lawrence Freedman et al eds., 1986); C.J.

Botha, Clausewitz's 'Kleinkrieg' and Mao's 'Fishes in the Water': Mushkat in Proper
Conceptual Perspective, 8 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 141, 147 (1982) (depicting terrorism as "a
combination of threats and the actual use of terror to create a psychological effect"); T.P.

Thornton, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, INTERNAL WAR 73 (Harry Eckstein ed.,
1964) (maintaining that terrorism is characterized by "its high symbolic content").
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They are Prompted by the feeling of "misery, frustration, grievance and
because of their inability to achieve their objective by
despair,"
regular or lawful means or through the medium of an armed struggle
conducted in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
The victims of their violent acts are seldom the person or institution
whose attention they seek to attract through their evil deeds. In some
cases they are quite prepared to sacrifice their own lives for the cause
and in the process of executing the acts of violence. They might even be
intent on doing so as a strategy for success and with a view to adding
personal martyrdom to their cause.
Terrorism as a means of combat has accordingly been defined as
[a]ny other act intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or any international
97
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act."
Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations refer
more generally to "criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
persons for political purposes . . . whatever the considerations of a
political, philosophical, ideological, racial,98 ethnic, religious or other
nature that may be invoked to justify them.",
The United Nations has addressed the problem of international
terrorism on many occasions, 9 9 culminating in the 1994 Declaration on
96. G.A. Res. 40/61, at 301, U.N. Doc. AIRES/40/53 (Dec. 9, 1985).
97. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A.
Res. 54/109, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/49 (Dec. 9, 1999); see also Emanuel Gross, Use of
Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertainto a War Waged by a
Democratic State Against Terrorism, in 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 445, 451 (2002) [hereinafter
Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields] (singling out as factors common to various

definitions of terrorism, "its aspiration to spread terror and instill fear among the civilian
population and the design of its activities to cause injury and destruction to the property of the
citizens of the democratic state"); Emanuel Gross, The Laws of War Waged Between
DemocraticStates and Terrorist Organizations:Real or Illusive?, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 389, 389480 (2003) [hereinafter Gross, The Laws of War]; Hanne Sophie Greve, Acts of Terrorism and
Crimes Within the Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminal Court, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

ASBJORN EIDE, supra note 77, at 92-93.
2, U.N. Doc.
98. Measures to Eliminate InternationalTerrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210,
A/RES/51/49 (Dec. 17, 1996); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
53/108,
2 & 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/63 (Jan. 26, 1999).
99. WAYNE McCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 1 (2008); Patrick Robinson,
The Missing Crimes, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 497, at 510-13 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 100 supplemented in 1996
by further measures, 10 1 the 1997 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 10 2 and the 1999 International
03
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
Following September 11 th, the Security Council added its voice to the
ongoing concerns regarding terrorism, 104 noting among other things in a
subsequent Resolution that "acts, methods, and practices of terrorism
are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and
that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist acts are also
10 5
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations."'
The core component of terrorism is the targeting of civilians or
civilian objects with a view to intimidating persons in authority to give
in to the demands of the perpetrators. Firing rockets at non-military
(civilian) targets in Israel, or indiscriminately into non-military
populated areas, with a view to intimidating Israel, is an act of
terrorism. But does it constitute an international crime?
During the 1980s, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted a series of resolutions that seem to suggest that terrorism is a
permissible means of resistance against colonial rule, foreign
domination, or a racist regime. In the Preamble to a Resolution of 1985
on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, the General Assembly
of the United Nations thus reaffirmed "the legitimacy of their struggle,
in particular the struggle of national liberation movements," against
10 6
colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination,
thereby suggesting that the armed operations of liberation movements
ought not to be perceived as acts of terrorism.' 7 It has subsequently
been argued, somewhat obscurely, that international law excludes the
struggle for self-determination and independence from the concept of
terrorism even though some of the militant acts resorted to by freedom
100. Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, at
303, U.N. Doc. AIRES/49/49 (Dec. 9, 1994).

101. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/49 (Dec. 17, 1996) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 51/210].
102. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
52/164, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164/Annex (Dec. 15, 1977).
103.

InternationalConvention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra

note 97.
104. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). (2001).
105. S.C. Res. 1373, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
106. G.A. Res. 40/61, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985); see also Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3034
(XXVII)], 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3034 (Dec. 18, 1972).
107. See Richard Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 415, 425 (1969) (arguing that the use of terror as an instrument of change derived a
certain legitimacy to the extent that its use received the endorsement of international
instruments).
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10 8
fighters might in themselves contain all the elements of terrorism.
This view is based on the assumption that the norm against terrorism is
subordinate to the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial
rule or foreign domination, which right must admittedly be exercised in
accordance with the U.N. Charter and the Declaration on Friendly
Relations between States (which instruments, according to this view, do
not prohibit acts of terrorism). 1° 9 Judge Hanne Greve noted more
broadly that international law does not outlaw terrorism per se but only
prohibits certain types of violence (which in some instances include acts
of terror violence).
In Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali6, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg
(dissenting) maintained that terror against the civilian population is not
a customary law crime, basing his dissent in part on the fact that
terrorism was not included in the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
ICC. i" l Judge Schomburg had it all wrong. Terrorism was excluded
from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC exclusively as a
compromise with the United States, who at the early stages of the
deliberations of the Preparatory Committee objected to the ICC
exercising jurisdiction over perpetrators of terrorism; and the
customary-law disposition2 of terrorism was not the issue that prompted
the American proposal."1
The view that terrorism is not an international crime is most
unfortunate, as is the common clichd that "one man's terrorist is the
other man's freedom fighter," since terrorism is terrorism is terrorism,
and the fact that acts of terror are included in the military strategy of
liberation armies does not change the essential character of those deeds.
As noted by Judge Hanne Greve: "Even the most noble of causes-a
struggle for the most sacred values-cannot be fought without any
108. See, e.g., Statement by Mr. Robinson of Jamaica to the Sixth Committee of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/42/SR29,
2-9 (Oct. 27, 1987).
109. See Robinson, supra note 99, at 520.
110. Greve, supra note 97, at 100.
111. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galid (Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Schomburg), Case No. IT-98-29-A, 20 (Nov. 30, 2006).
112. In October 1994, in the debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the
statute for an international criminal court prepared by the International Law Commission (that
is, long before it was decided to confine the jurisdiction of the ICC to customary law crimes),
Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor to the United States Department of State, made it known that
the United States opposed the inclusion of international drug trafficking and terrorism in the
subject-matter jurisdiction of an international criminal court because in those instances "national
prosecutions will normally be preferable to international ones." USUN Press Release #149-(94)
(Oct. 25, 1994) (on file with author); see also Statement on Agenda Item 142 (1995) in the
General Assembly by Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of
State, USUN Press Release #182-(95) (Nov. 1, 1995) (on file with author) proclaiming that
"[t]he crime of terrorism and drug crimes. . . present particular problems of investigation and
prosecution which the court would inevitably be il--equipped to address.").
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restrictions as to means and methods. That some means and methods are
rejected and outlawed, does not
entail a moral or legal judgment
13
concerning the aims fought for."'
In subsequent resolutions, the General Assembly did proclaim
unequivocally that "all acts, methods and practices of terrorism" are
' 14
criminal and unjustifiable, "wherever and by whomever committed." "
It called on States "to ensure the apprehension and prosecution or
extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts,"" 5 and to cooperate and
exchange information as a means of facilitating the prevention and
combating of international terrorism. 116
The question whether or not acts of terror come within the
perimeters of international humanitarian law has also been challenged.
In the Celebii Case, the ICTY stated that civil unrest and terrorism do
not constitute armed conflicts, absent the "protracted extent of the
armed violence" and the "extent of organisation (sic) of the parties
involved" required for violent conduct to qualify as an armed conflict
not of an international character." 7 France added a declaration to its
instrument of ratification of the ICC Statute which likewise proclaims
that "the term 'armed conflict' . . ., in and of itself and in its context,

refers to a situation of a kind which does not include the commission of
ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether collective or
isolated."' 18
This must not be taken to mean that resort to acts of terror
committed as a strategy of war by an organized armed group engaged in
protracted armed violence against governmental armed forces or against
the armed forces of another armed group not aligned with any
government would disqualify the armed struggle from being an armed
conflict.
The events of September 11, 2001 have again reminded one that
113. Greve, supra note 97, at 101.
114. G.A. Res. 42/159, at 300, U.N. Doc. A/42/29 (Dec. 7, 1987); G.A. Res. 44/29, at 164,
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 4, 1989); G.A. Res. 46/5 1, at 283, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 9, 1991);
G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 101; G.A. Res. 53/108, at 364, U.N. Doc. A/53/49 (Dec. 8, 1998).
115. G.A. Res. 42/159, supra note 114,
5(b); G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 114, 1 4(b);
G.A. Res. 46/51, supra note 114, 3.
116. G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 114,
4(d); G.A. Res. 46/51, supra note 114, T 4(d);
G.A. Res. 51/210, supra note 101, 3; G.A. Res. 53/108, supra note 114, 1 3,4.
117. Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delali6 & others (the "Celebidi Case"), Case No. IT-96-2 1-T,
184 (Nov. 16, 1998); see also Andreas Zimmermann, PreliminaryRemarks on Par.2(c)-() and
Par. 3: War Crimes Committed in Armed Conflicts not of an International Character, in

262, 276 (Otto
Triffierer ed., 1999).
118. France ratified the ICC Statute on July 9, 1999; see Antoine Buchet, L 'Integrationen
France de la Convention PortantStatute de la Cour Penale Internationale Histoire Breve et
Inachevee d'une Mutation Attendue, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE AND DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERs 65,
76-80 (Claus KreB & Flavia Lattanzi eds., 2000).
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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terror violence is not confined to individual perpetrators but, at the other
end of the spectrum, has also come to be a strategy of belligerency with
international dimensions. Militant efforts to bring about political
change, or to retain the constitutional status quo, in regions such as
Northern Ireland, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and the Basque regions of Spain,
resistance strategies in Palestine, and the armed struggle of the past of
peoples in Africa subject to colonial rule or a racist regime, have all
included acts of terror violence. Terrorism has indeed in this day and
age become a potent means of combat-both at the national and
international level.
International humanitarian law expressly prohibits as a war crime in
international armed conflicts, as well as armed conflicts not of an
international character, "[a]cts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population.'
In Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali6, the Appeals Chamber of the ITCY
decided that such acts of terror against the civilian population are
prohibited as a matter of customary international law;1 and further,
that customary international law imposes individual
criminal liability
12
for acts of terror against a civilian population. 1
Terrorism in all its manifestations is a crime and ought never to go
unpunished.
ends do
justify
theD.
means.
22 One
is reminded here
of the truismThe
attributed
to not
Justice
Louis
Brandeis
(1856-1941):
"One can never be sure of ends-political, social,
economic. There must always be doubt and difference of
opinion; one can be 51 per cent sure." There is not the same
margin of doubt as to means. Here "fundamentals do not
change; centuries of thought have established standards.123Lying
and sneaking are always bad, no matter what the ends."'
Those who provided Hamas with rockets (persons in Iran?) are also
criminally responsible, probably as co-perpetrators but if not, then at
least as accomplices.
Prosecution of terrorism in international tribunals is not the focus of
119. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(2); ProtocolAdditional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-InternationalArmed
Conflicts (Protocol II), 1977, art. 13(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
120. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Gali, Case No. IT-98-29-A, 1 87-90 (Nov. 30, 2006); see
also Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima & others, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, 1 666 (June 20,
2007).
121. Gali6, IT-98-29-A,
91-98.
122. See generallyGross, supra note 97, at 467, 522-24; see also Jenny Teichman, How to
Define Terrorism, 64 PHILOSOPHY 505, 514-17 (1989) (expressing reservations as to the
assumptions upon which justifications of terrorism are normally based).
123. Quoted in A.T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE, 569 (1956).
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the present survey. It might be noted as a point of interest, though, that
the Statute of the ICTR, 1 4 as well as the Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone (SCSL),'1 25 include terrorism as a crime within the
jurisdiction of those tribunals when committed in an armed conflict not
of an international character.' 26 There have thus far been no
prosecutions for terrorism in the ICTR, but there have been several in
the SCSL. 12 7 Even though the ICTY Statute does not mention terrorism
by name, there have also been prosecutions for acts of terror in the
ICTY. 128 Prior to basing a conviction on terrorism by name, several
judgments in the ICTY dealt with offences that included elements of
terrorism but under a different name. 129 Tihomir Blagki6, for example,
faced charges based on making the civilian population the object of an
attack, 130 and not so much on spreading terror. 13 1 However, the Trial
Chamber decided that the nature and scale of offensives against certain
villages showed that the soldiers were not merely fighting to overcome
armed resistance, "they terrorised '(sic)
the civilians by intensive
32
shelling, murders and sheer violence."'
Even though terrorism was deliberately excluded from the subject-

124. Statute of the InternationalTribunalfor Rwanda, art. 4(d), contained in the annex of
S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994), reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994).
125. Statute of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, art. 3(d), published as an Annex to the
Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishmentof a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N.
Doc. S/2000/915, Annex (Oct. 4, 2000) under the heading, Enclosure (at 21) [hereinafter SCSL
Statute].
126. Those provisions derive from Protocol II, which singles out as acts of terrorism one
of several manifestations of inhuman treatment that "are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever." Protocol II, supra note 119, art. 4(2)(d); see also id., art. 13(2)
(prohibiting "[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited.").
127. See Prosecutor v. Moinina Fofana & Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A,
350 (May 28, 2008) (specifying as elements of the crime (a) acts or threats of violence; (b)
directed willfully by the perpetrator against the civilian population or individual civilians not
taking direct part in the hostilities; and (c) carried out with the specific intent of spreading terror
among the civilian population); see also Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman & others (Decision
on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98), Case No SCSL-04-14-T, 667 (Oct.
21, 2005); Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima & others, Case No SCSL-04-16-T, 667 (June 20,
2007).
128. See generally Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galid, Case No. IT-98-29-T (Dec. 5, 2003),
confirmed on appeal in Galik, IT-98-29-A; Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevi6 & Dragan Joki6,
Case No. IT-02-60-T (Jan. 17, 2005).
129. See generally Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic & Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT02-60-T
(Jan. 17, 2005).
130. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(2).
131. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakid, Case No. IT-95-14-T, 12, n.26 (Mar. 3, 2000).
132. Id. 630.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

23

Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law,
Vol. 21, Iss.LAW3 [2009], Art. 3
JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL

[Vol. 21

matter jurisdiction of the ICC133-at least as a separate crime under that
name-terrorism constitutes an added component of crimes that do fall
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC. 134 Being an instance of
"inhumane acts.., causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or
mental or physical health," terrorism clearly qualifies for purposes of
ICC jurisdiction as a crime against humanity. Terrorism can also, in
the appropriate circumstances, be prosecuted in the ICC as a war crime
committed in an international armed conflict, either as an intentional
attack directed against the civilian population as such or against
individual civilians not taking direct part in the hostilities,' 36 or as an
intentional attack against civilian objects. 137 In armed conflicts not of an
international character, acts of terror constituting an intentional attack
directed against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, would likewise be
punishable as a war crime.'38
IV. OPERATING FROM WITHIN A CIVILIAN ENVIRONMENT
"The protection of civilians in times of armed conflict, whether
' 39
international or national, is the bedrock of modem humanitarian law."'
In Prosecutor v. Tihomir BlaWkik, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY stated
that the targeting of civilians "is an offence when not justified by
military necessity."' 40 The Appeals Chamber overruled this statement,
noting that "there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of civilians
in customary international law." 14' A particular problem emerges,

133.

Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the

Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10, Annex 1,

Resolution E (July 17, 1998); see Andreas Zimmermann, Introduction: Crimes not Included in
the Statute of the ICC, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 129, 131 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999); Greve, supra note 97, at 106-07.
134. Greve, supra note 97, at 107; see contra William A. Schabas, The International
CriminalCourt: The Secret of Its Success, in 12 CR. L. FORUM: AN INT'L J. 415, 426-27 (2001)
(stating that terrorism is not within the jurisdiction of the ICC as a crime against humanity).
135. Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(l)(k), U.N. Doc. A/CoNF.183/9
(July 17, 1998), reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
136. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i).
137. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(ii).
138. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(i). Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects has not been
included in the list of war crimes committed in armed conflicts not of an international character.
139.
140.
141.

Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupregkid & others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 521 (Jan. 14, 2000).
Bla§ki6, IT-95-14-T, 180.
Prosecutor v. Tihomir BlaWki, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 109 (29 July 2004); see also

Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunara6 & others, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-T, 426 (22 Febr. 2001);
Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj & others, Case No. IT-03-66-T, $ 186 (3 Nov. 2005).
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though, when a belligerent power operates from within a civilian
environment.
International humanitarian law places great emphasis on the need for
142
combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population,
"while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack.' ' 143 With the predicament of guerilla fighters in
mind, Protocol I does recognize that "there are situations in armed
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed
combatant cannot so distinguish himself," and in such circumstances
merely demands that the combatant carries his or her arms openly "(a)
during each military engagement, and (b) during such time as he is
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment
preceding the launching of an attack in which he [or she] is to
participate." 144
In his analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Emanuel Gross
seemed to suggest that terrorists, merely by orchestrating military
operations from a civilian environment and thereby placing the civilian
population in harm's way, amounts to the use of civilians as a human
shield. 145 That, perhaps, is pushing it too far. International humanitarian
law relating to human shields is more specifically aimed at a deliberate
act of singling out selected members of the civilian population to protect
a particular military target. 146 The "use of children to man the front line
and use them as human shields to protect Palestinian gunmen,"' 47 would
thus fit the accepted definition of a human shield. In the Trial of Kurt
Student, the British Military Court at Luneberg, Germany convicted the
accused for having used British prisoners of war as a human shield to
protect the advancing German troops near Maleme on the Island of
Crete, and which resulted in the killing of six of those prisoners of war
by fire of the British troops.' 48 In The High Command Case, the U.S.
142.

Shannon Bosch, Voluntary Human Shield: Status-less in the Crosshairs?,40 COMP.

& INT'L L.J. OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 322, 327, 331 (2007).

143. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 44(3).
144. Id.
145. Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields, supra note 97, at 445, 471; see generally
Gross, The Laws of War, supranote 97.
146. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii): War Crime of Using
Protected Persons as Shields, 2 (signifying the special intent of using the human shield as
shielding a military objective from attack, or shielding, favoring or impeding military
operations").
147. Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields, supra note 97, at 458-59; see Justice R.
Weiner, Co-Existence without Conflict: The Implementation of Legal Structures for IsraeliPalestinian Cooperation Pursuant to the Interim Peace Agreement, in 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
591, 679 (2000).
148.

Trial of Kurt Student, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 118, 119

(1948); see Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
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Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that "to use prisoners of war as a
shield for the troops is contrary to international law."' 4 9 More recently,
charges brought against Radovan Karadfi6 and Ratko Mladi6 by the
Prosecutor of the ICTY included the use of United Nations military
observers as "human shields."' 5 ° All charges against the accused were
confirmed by the ICTY and the Court issued a summons for their
arrest.'15 The Court described the alleged acts that constituted the
"human shield" complaint as follows:
Around 26 May 1995, Bosnian Serb forces selected United
Nations military observers in the Pale region and used them as
"human shields". Those observers were tied to potential targets
of NATO air-strikes, specifically the munition depot at
Joharinski Potok, the radar facility
site at Jahorina and a nearby
52
communications centre (sic).'
Using a human shield to avoid military attacks is forbidden,' 53 and
indeed constitutes a war crime. 154 The ICC Statute prohibits "Utilizing
the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain
' 55
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations."'
Inserting this provision in the ICC Statute was at least in part informed
by the use of human shields by Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War of
1990_91.56
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 2292 (2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW].
149. United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb & others, 11 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Judgment,
462, 588 (1950); see 2.1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 148, at

2292.
150. Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadlik & Ratko Mladi6, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Counts 14 &
16 of First Indictment, July 25, 1995.

151. Prosecutor v. Radovan Karad~i6 & Ratko Mladi6, Review of the Indictment Pursuant
to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61
(July 11, 1996).
152.

Id.

20.

153. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 148, Rule 97, at 337;
see also Gross, supra note 97, at 455.
154. Human Rights Watch, InternationalHumanitarianLaw Issues in a Potential War
with Iraq, § 1, availableat http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm.
155. ICC Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii).
156. See Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century
War and Its Possible Implicationsfor the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1051,
1077-78 (1998) (discussing the use of human shields by Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf
War); Human Rights Watch, supra note 154, § 1; G.A. Res. 46/134, .U.N. GAOR, Supp. No.
49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 17, 1991) (condemning the use of prisoners of war and civilians as
human shields by Saddam Hussein as being "a most grave and blatant violation of Iraq's
obligations under international law"); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
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Several provisions of Geneva law make the point. In terms of Article
23 of the Third Geneva Convention, the presence of a prisoner of war
may not be used "to render certain points or areas immune from military
action."157 The Fourth Geneva Convention contains a similar provision
applying to "protected persons" under that Convention. 158 Under the
heading of "Protection of the Civilian Population," Protocol I elaborated
as follows:
The presence or movement of the civilian population or
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or
areas immune from military operations, in particular in
attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield,
favour (sic) or impede military operations. The Parties to the
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian
population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield
military objectives from attacks or to shield military
operations. 159
Protocol I also provides that "in no circumstance shall medical
' 16° units
be used in an attempt to shield military objectives from attacks.
Protocol II, dealing with armed conflicts not of an international
character, does not expressly refer to the use of a human shield but does
provide that "the civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
the general p rotection against the dangers arising from military
operations, '
and this general provision clearly includes the use of
members of the civilian population as a human shield.
The ICC Statute by referring in general to "protected persons" as the
ones not to be used to render certain points, areas or military forces
immune from military operations, includes all protected persons within
the confines of its proscription, including all of the above, as well as the
wounded and sick members of the armed forces on land, and the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members
of the armed forces at sea.
62
This is a logical extension of the rule.'
supra note 148, at 337-38 (provoking extensive condemnation by States of Hussein's use of
prisoners of war and civilians as human shields and which was declared to be a war crime by the
United States).
157. Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 63, art. 23.
158. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 28.
159. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(7).
160. Id. art. 12(4).
161. Protocol II, supra note 119, art. 13(i).
162. William Fenrick, Utilizing the Presence of a Protected Person to Render Certain
Objects Immune from Military Operations, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT

253

(Otto

Triffterer

ed.,

1999).

Fenrick maintains

(erroneously) that the ICC Statute also prohibits the use of "military medical facilities ... and
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The duty of the belligerent power launching an attack to spare the
civilian population is absolute, and setting up of a human shield to
protect a military target is therefore a very serious matter. A human
shield does not relieve the opposing power from its obligation to take
constant care to spare the civilian population, individual civilians, and
civilian objects. 165 Protocol I qualifies that duty by only mandating the
cancellation of an attack that may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life or injury to civilians if such deaths or injuries would be
"excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated."' 164 If an attack is executed in circumstances warranted by
this directive, the defending Power which made use of a human shield
must bear full criminal responsibility for the deaths and injuries of the
civilians who constituted part of the human shield.
It is reasonable to conclude that the crime of using a human shield in
combat must be narrowly defined: It presupposes the protection of a
legitimate military target behind civilians belonging to a particular
category (children, prisoners of war, U.N. personnel) and not merely the
civilian population in general; and it is executed with intent to protect
the military target by placing the civilians within or in front of the
military object or advancing military forces. Conducting military
operations from within a civilian environment may not amount to the
use of a human shield but nevertheless constitutes a violation of the
laws and customs of armed conflict that place supreme emphasis on the
protection of the civilian population and individual civilians in times of
war. The Preamble to the Convention on Cluster Munitions of May 30,
2008 thus recorded the basic principle of international humanitarian law
proclaiming that "constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects. 165 This fundamental decree
applies equally to persons launching an offensive and those seeking to
protect themselves from an attack.
Assuming, therefore, that Hamas did not deliberately use the civilian
population of Gaza City as a human shield, the fact remains that by
conducting hostile acts from a civilian environment it acted in violation
of basic laws and customs of armed conflict. When civilian objects are
used for military purposes, those civilian objects become military
objectives; that is "objects which by their ... use make an effective
equipment" as a shield. Locating military hospitals, prisoner of war camps or civilian internee
camps in the proximity of a legitimate military target would only come within the confines of
the war crime under consideration if this has been done with the intention of using their inmates
as a human shield.
163. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(8), read with art. 57(1).
164. Id. art. 57(2)(b).
165. Convention on Cluster Munitions, pmbl., May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357, availableat
http://www.clustermunitionsdublin.ie/pdf/ENGLISHfinaltext.pdf.
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contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage. ' ' 166 Attacking such objects, and in the
process killing civilians, are then no longer an offence on the part of the
adversary Party to the conflict-subject, though, to restrictions to be
alluded to hereafter.
V. SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES

Israel had every right to defend itself against rocket attacks. Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations provides in part: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence (sic) if an
armed attack occurs against a Member State of
167
the United Nations."'
68
There can be no doubt that a rocket attack is an armed attack.
However, there are some strings attached to invoking the self-defense
provision of the U.N. Charter. The Member State acting in self-defense
must "immediately" report to the Security Council of the United
Nations the measures it has taken in self-defense, and self-defense
action must cease once the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.' 69 Self-defense
action by a Member State "shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council... to take at any time such action
as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security."' 170
The right to self-defense is not a license to kill. Parties to a conflict
must always "ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects.'' International humanitarian law is
particularly sensitive to the needs of daily civilian life in times of war.
The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV thus called for respect in times of
war for "[f]amily honour (sic) and rights, the lives of persons and
private property, as well as religious convictions and practice."' 1 The
166.

Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 52(2); see also Protocolon Prohibitionsor Restrictions

on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and Other Devices (ProtocolII) art. 2(4), Oct. 3, 1995, 19
I.L.M. 1529, as amended 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use ofIncendiary Weapons (ProtocolII1) art. 2(3), Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1534.

167. Charter of the UnitedNations, art. 51, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1043, 59 Stat. 1031; T.S. No.
993; reprintedin 3 BEVANS 1153 [hereinafter U.N. Charter].
168. See Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 49(1) (defining "attacks" as "acts of violence
against the adversary").
169. U.N. Charter, supra note 167, art. 51.
170.

Id.

171.
172.

Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 48.
Hague Convention No. IV, supra note 35, Regulation 46.
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Fourth Geneva Convention likewise proclaims the entitlement "in all
circumstances" of protected persons "to respect for their persons, their
honour (sic), their family rights, their religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs.'

173

Maria Stavropoulou

explained: "'Home' constitutes not only a means of 'shelter,' but also a
means of placing a person in a social and physical space,
'1 74 and of
circumscribing a person's private life and social interaction."
The Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflict, drafted by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1978, provides in compelling terms:
6. Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces
do not have an unlimited choice of methods and means of
warfare. It is prohibited to employ weapons or methods of
warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive
suffering.
7. Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants in order to spare
civilian population and property. Neither the civilian
population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of
attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against military
objectives.175
In the case of the Gaza offensive, one-from an Israeli
perspective-seems to be confronted with the following situation:
Hamas launches repeated and indiscriminate rocket attacks into Israel,
which in essence constitute acts of terrorism; Israel responds, as a
matter of self-defense, by means of a military offensive against Hamas;
Hamas conducts its militant activities from within a civilian
environment and thereby brings civilians and civilian objects within the
line of fire; many civilians are killed or injured and civilian objects,
including private homes, are destroyed or severely damaged. Who bears
the blame, under the norms of international humanitarian law, for the
civilian deaths and injuries and for the destruction of and damage to
properties?
173. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 27.
174. Maria Stavropoulou, The Right not to be Displaced,9 AM. UNIV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y
689, 717 (1994); see generally Robert Caplen, Rules of "Disengagement": Relating the
Establishment of Palestinian Gaza to Israel's Right to Exercise Self-Defense as Interpreted by
the InternationalCourt of Justiceat the Hague, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 679 (2006).
175. ICRC, FundamentalRules of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed
Conflict, 6 & 7 (1988), reprintedin DocUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 514 (Adam Roberts
& Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR].
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Deliberately launching an armed attack against civilians and civilian
objects is a serious offence. 176 Israel has given assurances that it did not
single out civilian or civilian objects as targets of an attack. But there is
more to it than just that. Protocol I also prohibits "launching an
indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects
in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life,
injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.' 77 An "indiscriminate
attack" is defined as:
(a)
those which are not directed at a specific military
objective;
(b)
those which employ methods or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c)
those which employ a method or means of combat
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this
Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to
strike military objectives
and civilians or civilian objects
178
without distinction.
Indiscriminate attacks against a civilian population or civilian
objects is subject to two further provisos: (a) The perpetrator had
knowledge that the attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to
civilians, or the damage to civilian objects; 179 and (b) The loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, the damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, could be expected to be excessive
in relation to the
180
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
According to the ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols,
the latter proviso has been interpreted by some analysts to mean that
any type of attack would be authorized, provided only that it does not
result in losses of life, injuries or damages that are excessive in relation
to the military advantage anticipated.18' This, according to the

176. ICC Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(b)(i) & (ii).
177. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 85(3)(b).
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. art. 51(4).
Id. art. 85(3)(b).
Id. read with art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
Claud Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Protection of the Civilian Population, in COMMENTARY

1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1979, at 625-26 (Yves Sandoz eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].

ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE

1949, 613,
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1 82
Commentary, is "manifestly incorrect":'

In order to comply with the conditions, the attack must be
directed against a military objective with means which are not
disproportionate in relation to the objective, but are suited to
destroying only the objective, and the effects of the attacks
must be limited in the way required by the Protocol; moreover,
even after those conditions are fulfilled, the3 incidental civilian
losses and damages must not be excessive.'
The ICRC Commentary goes on to note that in some situations
proportionality between the losses and damages on the one hand, and
the military advantage to be achieved on the other, will be difficult to
calculate; and in84 such cases "the interests of the civilian population
should prevail."1
The ICC Statute likewise prohibits as a war crime: "Intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians ... which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated.' ' 185 The Elements of Crimes explain that the
attack is to be such "that it would cause incidental death or injury to
civilians or damage to civilian objects. .. and that such death, injury or
damage would be of such an extent as to be clearly excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."' 186 Use
of the verbs "would cause" (instead of "will cause") was inserted to
make allowance for prosecutions in cases where the expected loss of
life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian objects did not actually
occur due, for example, to the bomb not exploding.
A footnote added to the Elements of Crimes sought to clarify the
meaning of "concrete and overall military advantage." r1 8 It provides:
The expression "concrete and direct overall military
advantage" refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable by
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. ICC Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(b)(iii).Id. art. 8(2)(b)(iii).
186. Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiv), War Crime of Attacking
Objects or Persons Using the Distinctive Emblems of the Geneva Conventions, 2; see Eve La
Haye, The Elaboration of the Elements of Crimes, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 305, 319 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 2004).
187. See Knut Dbrmann, War Crimes in the Elements of Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, 95,

124-25 (Horst Fisher, Claus KreB & Sascha Rold Lder eds., 2001).
188. Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, n.36.
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the perpetrator at the relevant time. Such advantage may or
may not be temporally or geographically related to the object
of the attack. The fact that this crime admits the possibility of
lawful incidental injury and collateral damage does not in any
way justify any violation of the law applicable in armed
conflict. It does not address justifications for war or other rules
related to jus ad bellum. It reflects the proportionality
requirement in determining the legality of any 8military
activity
9
conflict.'
armed
an
of
context
the
in
undertaken
The proportionality test to be applied for the purpose or legitimizing
collateral losses of life, injuries, or damages in view of the military
advantage of the attack is difficult to apply, 9° perhaps because it is not
altogether governed by objective criteria. One is here dealing with a
military advantage anticipated by the perpetrator when he or she
planned and executed the attack.
The Elements of Crimes proceed on the general assumption that
where the mental element required for a particular crime, through the
use of terms such as "inhumane" or "severe," involves a value judgment
to be made, it is not to say that the perpetrator personally completed that
value judgment. 19 A footnote observation recorded that this directive
does not apply in the present case: The applicable mens rea requirement
demands that the perpetrator makes the value judgment of weighing the
to-be-expected loss of civilian lives or injury to civilians, or the damage
to civilian objects, up against the direct and overall military advantage
to be gained by the attack; and he or she must base that value judgment
on the information available to him or her at the time. 192 It is noted
elsewhere that the expression, "concrete and direct overall military
advantage" refers to a military advantage that is foreseeable to the
perpetrator at the relevant time. 93
An ICRC Commentary furthermore noted that "[t]he expression
'concrete and direct' was intended to show that the advantage
concerned should be substantial and relatively close, and that
advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which would only
appear in the long term should be disregarded."' 9 4 However, several
189. Id.; see D6rmann, supra note 187, at 125-27 (giving an indepth analysis of n.36 in
previous cite).
190. Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 379, 399 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).

191.
192.
193.
194.
note 181,

Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, GeneralIntroduction, 4.
Id. n.37.
Id. n.36.
Claud Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Precautions in Attack, in ICRC COMMENTARY, supra
at 684, 2209.
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countries-including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdomhave included in their instruments of ratification of Protocol I a
reservation or understanding denoting that the military advantage
anticipated refers to the attack considered as a whole and not to isolated
or particular parts of the attack.' 9 5 A joint proposal submitted by
Switzerland and the United Kingdom in the Working Group on
Definitions and Elements of Crimes of the Preparatory Committee to
encapsulate this position was included in the ICC Statute's definition of
the crime pertaining to the incidental loss of life or injury of civilians or
collateral damage to civilian objects of the natural environment.' 96 A
footnote observation in the Elements of Crimes emphasizes that the
military advantage may or may not be temporally or geographically
related 9to7 the object-here, it is submitted, meaning the target--of the
attack. 1
Leila Sadat expressed the view that the above directive in the
Elements of Crimes, "by referring to an advantage that is 'foreseeable'
and may or may not be 'temporally or geographically related to the
attack,' would appear to be inconsistent with the Statute's requirement
' 98
[in article 8(2)(b)(iv)] that the advantage be 'concrete and direct."
That, in this writer's respectful opinion, is a miscalculation of the
Drafter's intent in referring to "the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated"--which was inserted in the ICC Statute (with
emphasis on "overall military advantage anticipated") in order to
accommodate the view reflected in the ratification instruments of
Protocol I of Belgium and other countries mentioned. 199
In terms of a general provision inserted in the Elements of Crimes, a
perpetrator need not complete a particular value judgment in cases
195.

See the summary of reservations, understandings, and declarations attending the

ratification instruments pertaining to Protocol I and II in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR,

supra note 175, at 499-512; Andreas Zimmermann, Die Schaffung eines stindigen
InternationalenStrafgerichtshofes: Perspektiven und Probleme vor der Staatenkonferenz in
Rom, in 58 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 47, 67

n.135 (1998).
196. The Swiss/U.K. proposal is reflected in Decisions Taken by the Preparatory
Committee at Its Meeting of 1-12 December 1997, Annex I, Art. 20 C.B(b), Option II, at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997) (referring to the incidental loss of life or injury to

civilians, or damage to the natural environment having to be "excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."
Zimmermann, supranote 195, at 67; Bothe, supra note 190, at 399.
197. Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, n.36.

198.

LEILA

NADYA

SADAT,

THE

INTERNATIONAL

(emphasis

CRIMINAL

COURT

added);

see

AND

THE

TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 165 (2002).
199. See also Theodor Meron, Crimes Under the Jurisdictionof the InternationalCriminal
Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF

ADRIAAN Bos (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999).
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where a value judgment is included in the elements of any particular
crime, but this applies "unless otherwise indicated., 20 0 In the case of
collateral harm and damage, the perpetrator is indeed required to make a
value judgment. 20 1 One is reminded in this regard of the judgment at
Nuremberg in the Hostage Case where it was noted that in establishing
the guilt or innocence of a commanding officer engaged in armed
combat, "the situation as it appeared to him must be given the first
consideration." 202 Even though an analysis of the facts in retrospect
might show that the commanding officer made an error of judgment, a
court of law must judge the situation "as it appeared to the defendant at
the time. 20 3 The Tribunal went on to say "[i]f the facts were such as
would justify the action by the exercise of judgment, after giving
consideration to all the factors and existing possibilities, even though
the conclusion reached may have been faulty, it cannot be said to be
criminal. 20 4 A footnote inserted in the Elements of Crimes endorses
this position. It provides-as we have seen-that the perpetrator must,
in this instance, indeed evaluate the foreseen collateral deaths, injuries
and damage against the overall military advantage to be achieved
through the attack of a military target, but then goes on to state that
"[a]n evaluation of that value judgment must be based
20 5 on the requisite
information available to the perpetrator at the time."
Applying these directives to the situation in Gaza, there seems to be
no basis whatsoever for holding that the extensive losses of civilian
lives and injuries suffered by civilians, and the destruction and damage
of civilian objects, were not foreseeable, and indeed foreseen, by the
Israeli command. The question then remains whether or not those
civilian deaths, injuries and damages were proportional to the overall
military advantage of the offensive contemplated by the Israeli officials
in command.
It should finally be noted that what in the past were considered
acceptable collateral damages, losses of life or personal injuries might
no longer be acceptable. 2 6 Contemporary technologies of precision
targeting must surely place serious constraints on the extent to which
damages, deaths, and injuries may be justified as necessary side effects
200.

Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, GeneralIntroduction, 14.

201.

Id. n.37.

202. United States v. Wilhelm List, 11 TmiALs OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, NUERENBERG
OCTOBER 1946-APRIL 1949, 757, 1245-46 (1950).
203. Id. at 1296.

204. Id.
205. Elements of Crimes, supra note 72, n.37.

206. Richard Desgagnee, The Prevention of Environmental Damage in Time of Armed
Conflict: Proportionality and Precautionary Measures, 3 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 109,

116-17 (2000).
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of an attack upon a legitimate military target. In evaluating collateral
damage to the natural environment caused by the NATO bombing
campaign of March 24 to June 9, 1999 against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (as it then was), a Committee established by the ICTY
observed: "It is difficult to assess the relative values to be assigned to
the military advantage gained and harm done to the natural
environment, and the application of the principle of proportionality is
more easily stated than applied in practice." 207 The Committee noted,
however, that "[e]ven when targeting admittedly legitimate military
objectives, there is a need to avoid excessive long-term damage to the
with a consequential
economic infrastructure and natural environment
' 20 8
adverse affect on the civilian population."
VI. REPRISAL
Hamas cannot justify the rocket attacks aimed at Israeli targets as a
matter of self-defense within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Leaving aside the fact that Palestine is not a Member State of
the United Nations (I would always argue that for purposes of
upholding the laws and customs of armed conflict, its rights and
obligations should be established as though it were a State), the
hardships caused by de facto control by Israel over the day-to-day lives
and livelihoods of the people of Gaza do not amount to an "armed
attack" within the meaning of Article 51. It would seem that the rocket
attacks can at best be classified as an instance of reprisals.
Reprisals can be defined as "acts which, although normally illegal,
are exceptionally permitted as reaction of one state against a violation of
its right by another state." 20 9 There are currently no clear answers
regarding the legality in all circumstances of reprisals in times of armed
conflict and in response to unlawful acts committed by the perpetrator's
belligerent adversary. In the Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
declined to give a ruling as to the legality of armed reprisals in times of
peace, and could also find no cause "to pronounce on the question of
belligerent reprisals save to observe that in any case any right of

207. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
19, available at
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/OTPreportnato_bombingen.pdf(June 15, 2000).
208. Id. 18.
209. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20-21 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d
rev. ed. 1966).
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recourse to such reprisals would, like self-defence
(sic), be governed
210
inter alia by the principle of proportionality."
This obiter dictum already indicates that a distinction is made in
international law between (a) reprisals in peace time, now-a-days more
commonly referred to as "countermeasures" and (b) belligerent
reprisals.2 11 In this context the situation in Gaza is again fraught with
conceptual difficulties. If one were to assume that Israel is no longer an
Occupying Power in Gaza, then the rules pertaining to countermeasures
would apply: but if, on the other hand, it were to be found that Gaza is
still being occupied by Israel, then the militant action of Hamas would
be governed by the rules of belligerent reprisals.
In the post-World War II Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, the
Netherlands Special Court of Cassation held that reprisals were
permitted in times of peace as "a mode of compulsive settlement of
disputes wherever negotiations or other amicable means of settlement
have failed. 2 1 2 Reprisals in times of war were also not ruled out, but are
there confined "to cases where one belligerent violates or is alleged to
have violated the rules of warfare and the other belligerent retaliates 21in3
order to bring about a cessation of the existing or alleged violations.,
Based on the facts in that case, the Court of Cassation held that "the
killing of hostages and other innocent members of the.. . civilian
population" constituted "abusive or illegitimate reprisals." 2 14 The Court
also decided that reprisals in times of war can only be raised as "a
derived and not a personal defence (sic)"; that is to say, reprisals can
only be justified if they were embarked upon as an act of State and not
in the case of individuals "who
were not or could not be regarded as
215
acting in the State's name."
Reprisals in peace time (countermeasures) can at best be warranted if
they were embarked upon in response to a previous wrongful act of
another State (pre-emptive action is not permitted); after the delinquent
State committing the wrongful act has been placed on terms to
discontinue its wrongful act and to make reparation for it; and if the
countermeasures were commensurate to the injury suffered. 2 16 It must
210.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 246 (July 8,

1996).
211. See Karl Josef Partsch, Reprisals, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 20 (2000).
212. Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, Netherlands Special Court of Cassation, 14 L. REP.
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 89, 129 (12 Jan. 1949); see also In Re Rauter, Special Appeals
Court, Netherlands (12 Jan. 1949), 16 INT'L L. REP. 526, 538-42 (1949).
213. Trial of Hans Albin Rauter, supra note 212, at 130.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 132.

216.

Case Concerning the Gabtikovo-Magymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 7,

56 (25 Sept. 1997).
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be terminated as soon as the violation has ceased, provided there is no
longer any danger of a repetition of the violation and compensation for
damages suffered by the victim State has been provided. Only the
victim State can take action, and the victim State is precluded from
taking action against any third State.2t 7
The means employed as countermeasures are also subject to radical
limitations. It is generally required that peace-time reprisals must be
confined to economic, financial, or other peaceful means and may not
include military action or the use of force.28 Hans Kelsen mentioned as
"typical examples" of reprisals, "confiscation of property of the state or
of its citizens, or nonfulfillment of treaty obligations in relation to that
state. ,,2 19 It habe
has been pointed out, though, that the Security Council of
the United Nations has not applied this principle consistently and has
held on occasion that reprisals by force are not prohibited in peace time,
provided such reprisals are "reasonable
and correspond with the
220
requirements of belligerent reprisals."
Christopher Greenwood
has highlighted three "defining
characteristics" of belligerent reprisals: (a) Reprisals consist of conduct
that would in the normal course of events constitute a violation of the
laws of armed conflict but are rendered lawful by the special
circumstances which provoked them; (b) Reprisals are embarked upon
in response to a prior violation of the laws of armed conflict committed
by the State, or an ally of the State, against which acts of reprisal are
directed; and (c) Reprisals must be confined to action which is
reasonably proportional to the unlawful act to which they relate, must
be embarked upon as a means of putting an end to the prior violation of
the laws of armed conflict committed by the221concerned State or its ally,
and must only be resorted to as a last resort.
217. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 249, at 127 (June 27, 1986).
218. Id.; see also Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 35 (9 April 1949);
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and CoOperationAmong States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625
of 24 Oct. 1970, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (proclaiming

under the heading: The principle that States shall refrain in their internationalrelationsfrom
the threat or use offorce againstthe territorialintegrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UnitedNations: "States have a duty

to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.").
219. KELSEN, supra note 209, at 21.
220. Partsch, supra note 211, at 202; see also Karl Josef Partsch, Self-Preservation, in 4
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 380, 382 (2000).
221. Christopher J. Greenwood, Belligerent Reprisals in the Jurisprudence of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 539, 541-42
(Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001); see also Frangoise J. Hampson, Belligerent Reprisals and the

1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 818, 822 (1988).
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In order to serve its purpose, an act of reprisal must be performed
openly and must be terminated as soon as the unlawful act of the target
State has come to an end.222 Reprisals may not be embarked upon
merely as a matter of revenge,
or as stated by Frits Kalshoven:
"[R]eprisals by definition are measures not of punishment but of
enforcement." 22 4 The breach of international humanitarian law that
provoked the act of reprisal must be a deliberate and not merely an
"accidental" breach.225 It has also been said that one should first seek
redress before embarking unilaterally on an act of reprisal.226
Frits Kalshoven, in his seminal work on Belligerent Reprisals, also
emphasized the element of "subsidiarity," noting that "recourse to
belligerent reprisals is an exceptional measure which must be regarded
as an ultimate remedy,2 2after
other available means of a less exceptional
7
character have failed."

While belligerent reprisals have generally been accepted in the past
as legitimate within the above confines and as a useful tool 228
of
law,
humanitarian
of
violations
of
recurrence
a
prevent
to
deterrence
there has since World War II been a general tendency to prohibit its use
in international armed conflicts. The Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 prohibit reprisals against the wounded and sick in armed forces in
the field, 229 and against the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of
the armed forces at sea, 2 30 prisoners of war, 23 1 and civilians who at any
given moment find themselves, in the case of an armed conflict or
occupation, "in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals."23 The same protection also applies to
personnel, buildings, vessels, and equipment protected under the
222. Greenwood, supra note 221, at 542.
223. Id.; see also KELSEN, supra note 209, at 149-50.
224. Frits Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals Revisited, 21 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 43,
78 (1990); see also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility ofStatesfor
Internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter I.L.C., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts], in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FIFTYTHIRD SESSION (23 APRIL- I JUNE AND 2 JULY-10 AUGUST 2001), U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10), at

43, U.N. Doe. A/56/10 (2001), Commentary on Article 49,
(1), at 328-29 (noting that
countermeasures "are not intended as a form of punishment for wrongful conduct but as an
instrument for achieving compliance with obligations of the responsible State").
225. Hampson, supra note 221, at 843.
226. See Partsch, supra note 211, at 202-04.
227. FRTs KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS, 340 (1971); see also Prosecutor v. Zoran
Kupre~ki6 & others, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 535 (14 Jan. 2000).
228.

Hampson supra note 221, at 838, 843; see also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,

supra note 175, at 30.
229. Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 63, art. 46.
230. Geneva Convention No. II, supra note 63, art. 47.
231. Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 63, art. 13.
232. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 4.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

39

Florida Journal FLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 3
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21

Geneva Conventions for the protection of the wounded and sick in
armed forces in the field, and for the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked
members of the armed forces at sea, 233 and the property of civilians
protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention,23 as well as cultural
property protected in virtue of the 1954 Hague Convention235for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.
The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 has
taken great steps forward in proscribing belligerent reprisals involving
property interests in international armed conflicts. It indeed reiterated
the prohibition of attacks by way of reprisals against the civilian
population or civilians, 236 but then went on to extend the prohibition to
civilian objects, 237 cultural objects and places of worship, 238 objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,
the natural
environment, 240 and works and installations containing dangerous
forces, such as dams and dykes (levies), and nuclear electrical
generating stations, not being2 4used for regular, significant, and direct
support of military operations. 1
The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices prohibits "in all circumstances"
the directing of weapons to which the Protocol applies by way of
reprisals 24against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians.
The main obstacle facing Hamas if it were to seek justification for
the rocket attacks within the law of reprisals is the indiscriminate
targeting of Israeli towns and villages, which include civilians and
civilian objects and are in fact predominantly occupied by civilians. The
ICTY has on several occasions proclaimed that customary international
law has come to prohibit reprisals against civilians under all
circumstances, and in international armed conflicts as well as in armed
233. Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 63, art. 46; Geneva Convention No. II, supra
note 63, art. 47.
234. Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 33.
235. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, The Hague, 14 May 1954, art. 4(4), 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (1956).
236. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51 (6).
237. Id. art. 52(1).
238. Id. art. 53(c), read with art. 53(a).
239. Id. art. 54(4), read with art. 54(2).
240. Id. art. 55(2).
241. 1d. art. 56(4), read with art. 56(1) & (2).
242. Protocolon Prohibitionsor Restrictionson the Use ofMines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices (ProtocolII), supra note 166, art. 3(2); see also Amended Protocol on Prohibitionsor
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (1996 Amended ProtocolII),
art. 3(7), 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996), which extended the protection to also include civilian objects.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol21/iss3/3

40

van der
Vyver: Legal Ramifications of the War in Gaza
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE WAR IN GAZA

conflicts not of an international character. 243 In Prosecutor v. Zoran
Kupreki6, a Trial Chamber of the ICTY, having asserted that "[t]he
protection of civilians in times of armed conflict, whether international
or national, is the bedrock of modem humanitarian law," 244 and noting
that reprisals against civilians "are inherently a barbarous means of
seeking compliance with international law" 245 and constitutes "a blatant
infringement of the most fundamental principles of human rights, 246
had little hesitation in proclaiming that a prohibition of reprisals against
a civilian population should be accepted as a customary rule of
international law. 247 Christopher Greenwood contested this proposition,
noting that customary international248law does not prohibit reprisals
against civilians in all circumstances.
Greenwood pointed out that the Fourth Geneva Convention only
prohibits reprisals against civilians "who, at a given moment and in any
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in the case of a conflict or
occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power
of which they are not nationals" and therefore does not cover reprisals
against the civilian population in enemy or an occupied territory but
who do not find themselves "in the hands of" the enemy or Occupying
Power. 249 Protocol I indeed extended the prohibition of reprisals to
cover, in cases of international armed conflicts, "the civilian population
or civilians" in general. 250 The question whether or not this provision
constitutes a rule of customary international law, given among other
things reservations entered by several States Parties to Protocol I in their
respective instruments of ratification, is, according to Greenwood,
doubtful. 25 1 Earlier, the same author predicted that although there has

243. Prosecutor v. Milan Martid (Rule 61), Case No. IT-95-1 I-R61, 9 15-17 (8 March
1996); Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupregki6 & others, Case No. IT-95-16-T,
527-35 (14 Jan 2000);
and for a critical analysis of these judgments, see Greenwood, supra note 221, at 549-56.
244. Kupre§kiW, IT-95-16-T, 521.
245. Id. 528.
246. Id. 529.
247. Id. 531.
248. Greenwood, supra note 221, at 540.
249. Id. at 542-43, with reference to Geneva Convention No. IV, supra note 63, art. 4.
250. Protocol I, supra note 21, art. 51(6).
251. Greenwood, supra note 221, at 543-46; see also Antonio Cassese, The Geneva
Protocols of 1977 on the HumanitarianLaw of Armed Conflict and Customary International
Law, 3 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN L.J. 55, at 102-03 (1984) (noting that the provisions of art. 51(6) of
Protocol 1, prohibiting reprisals against civilians and civilian object (respectively) was most
likely not part of customary international law when they were adopted in 1977); Christopher
Greenwood, CustomaryLaw Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols,in HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT: THE ROAD AHEAD 93, at 110-11 (Astrid J. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds.,
1991).
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been a general trend toward the decline of legally sanctioned reprisals,
"belligerent reprisals will continue to enjoy a twilight existence.
The International Law Commission, on the other hand, in its most
recent report on Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), noted that a paragraph in the
Draft Articles dealing with countermeasures "reflects the basic
prohibition of reprisals against individuals, which exists in international
humanitarian law." 253 The paragraph proclaims that "[c]ountermeasures
shall not affect ... obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting
reprisals, '254 and was based on a provision in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties which refers to "protection of the human person
contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to
provisions prohibiting
any form of reprisals against persons protected
255
treaties."
by such
As far as armed conflicts not of an international character are
concerned, it might be noted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 as well as the Second Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions, do not expressly address the question of
belligerent reprisals at all. The only international instrument that deals
with reprisals in armed conflicts not of an international character is the
1954 Hague Convention 256
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict.
However, the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 requiring all persons not taking an
active part in the hostilities in cases of armed conflicts not of an
international character to be treated humanely, 257 have been interpreted
by no other than the International Law Commission to denote that "any
reprisals in non-international armed conflicts with respect to the
expressly prohibited acts as well as any other reprisal incompatible with
the absolute requirement of humane treatment" are prohibited.258 This
252.

C. Greenwood, The Twilight of the Law of Belligerent Reprisals, NETHERLANDS Y.B.

INT'L L. 35, 69 (1989).

253. I.L.C., Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
supra note 224, Commentary on Article 50, 8, at 132.
254.

Id. art. 50(1)(c).

255. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60(5), G.A. Res. 128 of 15 Dec. 1989,
44 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 49), at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989).
256. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, supra note 235, art. 4(4).
257. Geneva Convention No. I, supra note 63, art. 3(1); Geneva Convention No. II, supra
note 63, art. 3(1); Geneva Convention No. III, supra note 63, art. 3(1); Geneva Convention No.
IV, supra note 63, art. 3(1).
258.

International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, in REPORT OF

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-SEVENTH SESSION
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proposition is founded on the rather contentious assumption that
reprisals must not violate basic principles of humanity. 259 This
assumption has in recent times been endorsed by the ICTY, 260 but has
been discarded by, among others, Christopher Greenwood who noted
261
that "support for this proposition in State practice is decidedly thin."
Frits Kalshoven, having considered the absence of provisions relating to
reprisals in Common Article 3 and Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, concluded some time ago that he
"would not venture to argue by way of analogy that as a matter of law,
measures that resemble reprisals against the
civilian population are
262
prohibited in internal armed conflict as well.9
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the case of Prosecutor v.
Kupre0iW based its submission that belligerent reprisals against
civilians have become outlawed as a matter of customary international
law on compelling grounds. A rule of customary international law
usually derives from general state practice, supported by opinio iuris ex
necessitate. However, referring to the Martins Clause, which
highlighted "the usages established between civilized nations, . . . the

laws of humanity, and the requirements of public conscience" as
sources of the principles of the law of nations (customary international
law), 263 the Trial Chamber observed that "principles of international
humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the
pressure of the demands of humanity or the dictates of public
conscience, even where State practice is scant or inconsistent."2 The
Tribunal depicted the protection of the civilian population in times of
21 JULY 1995), 50 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10), at 91, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995), Comment on
Article 14, 18 (1995); see also Kupregki6, IT-95-16-T, at 521, 534.
259.

See KALSHOVEN, supra note 227, at 342-44.

260. Kupreki, IT-95-16-T, at 521, 527-35.
261. Greenwood, supra note 221, at 542; see also Greenwood, supra note 251, at 48
(noting that the principle of humanity "probably adds little to the law of reprisals"); see, e.g.,
KALSHOVEN, supra note 227, at 342-44.

262.
263.

Kalshoven, supra note 224, at 78-79.
Hague Convention No. IV, supranote 35, pmbl.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high
contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in
the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.

Id. The Clause first appeared in the Preamble of the Convention with respect to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403, reprintedin I
BEVANS 247 and 1 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 129 (1907).
264. Kupregki, IT-95-16-T, at 521, 527.
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armed conflict-intemational or internal-as "the bedrock of modem
humanitarian law," 265 and noted that "reprisals against civilians are
inherently a barbarous means of seeking compliance with international
law. 26 6 It concluded that "the reprisal killing of innocent persons, more
or less chosen at random, without any requirement of guilt or any form
of trial, can safely be characterized as a blatant infringement of the most
fundamental principles of human rights" and that "belligerent reprisals
against civilians and fundamental human rights of human beings are
absolutely inconsistent with legal concepts."2
Earlier, the ICJ has decided, with reference to Common Article 3,
that "the minimum rules applicable
to international and non268
international conflicts are identical.,
The ICC Statute is silent on reprisals. They are not mentioned as a
war crime or as a ground of justification for any of the belligerent acts
that have been criminalized. One analyst suggested that the ICC may
consider the matter under the provisions of Article 21(1)(b) of the ICC
Statute which proclaims "applicable treaties and the principles and rules
of international
law" to be a secondary source of the law to be applied
2 69
by the Court.
Article 31 of the ICC Statute does make allowance for the Court to
consider "a ground for excluding criminal responsibility" not mentioned
in the Statute, deriving the same from the sources of law specified in
Article 21. It is to be hoped that the ICC will not hesitate to find a
belligerent act lawful if it would be such under the applicable norms of
international humanitarian law. It should be noted, though, that reprisal
cannot serve as an excuse for committing
the crime of genocide, crimes
270
against humanity, or war crimes.
The firing of rockets into civilian neighborhoods cannot under any
circumstances be justified under the rules applicable to either
countermeasures of belligerent reprisals.

265. Id. 521.
266. Id. 528.
267. Id. 529.
268. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 219, at 114 (27 June 1986).
269. Gabriella Venturini, The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in Respect
of War Crimes, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
171, 176-77 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999).
270. Enrico Mezzetti, Groundfor Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in 2 ESSAYS ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 143, 149 (Flavia Lattanzi & William

A. Schabas eds., 2004).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It should be evident to everyone that the war in Gaza did not produce
any winners, one way or the other. Hamas stands accused of acts of
terror violence and of conducting militant acts from within a civilian
environment, thereby placing the civilian population of Gaza and
civilian objects in harms way. Although Israel had every right to defend
itself against the military attacks orchestrated by Hamas, the large
number of civilian deaths and injuries and the devastation of civilian
homes and non-military objects in consequence of the Israeli offensive
can hardly be said to be proportional to the overall military advantage
derived from the military intervention. Given the numbers of those
casualties and the extent of the devastation of properties, it would
furthermore be extremely difficult to convince the world community
that those harmful consequences of the offensive were not foreseen and
that they can be justified in view of the overall military advantage
anticipated by the persons in authority. The war in Gaza again
confirmed that terrorism cannot be conquered through law enforcement
or armed responses alone. The tragic consequences of the onslaught
breed contempt in the minds of victims and those close to them, and
such contempt triggers the kind of despair which provides fertile soil for
the cultivation of further acts of terror.
The General Assembly of the United Nations has on occasion called
on States to find just and peaceful solutions to the underlying causes of
acts of terror violence, 27 or more specifically "to contribute to the
progressive elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism
and to pay special attention to all situations, including colonialism,
racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien domination
and occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may
endanger international peace and security. 2 72 That was good advice,
because the typical terrorist is more often than not obsessed with a
political ideal which he or she cannot achieve through legal or military
means, and addressing that which has driven him or her to acts of
desperation could be a sine qua non for lasting peace.
The General Assembly directive also corresponds with the U.N.
Carter, which calls on "parties to any dispute" to "first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice." 73 It is quite understandable that
271. G.A. Res. 3034 (XXVII), supra note 106, 2.
272. G.A. Res. 42/159, supra note 114, 8; G.A. Res. 44/29, supra note 114,
Res. 46/5 1, supra note 114, 6.
273. U.N. Charter, supra note 167, art. 33.
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persons in authority seeking to uphold the rule of law would not talk to
terrorists; and constructing a barrier between oneself and one's enemies
may seem a feasible solution to maintaining peace and security. But no
barrier can ever be strong or high enough to prevent the infiltration into
one's midst of clandestine aggressors or to block rockets fired from the
other side of the divide.
The time for meaningful, sincere, and effective mediation must now
come to pass.
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